Of Unity, Parts, Fuzz, Causation, and Reasonable Belief

(by Dlanorrenrag*)

Of Unity, Parts, Fuzz, Causation, and Reasonable Belief:

A mortal cannot describe a unifying, holistically precise perspective of his changing experiences. To take any mortal perspective, he must contrive to subtract himself and his medium of perception from whatever may remain of the whole to which he seeks to relate, thereby rendering his perception of such remainder fuzzy, incomplete, and less than whole.

A mortal cannot measure or record an exact perspective of any particular “caused” change about a whole. He may not carve out of any empirical whole any part that is precise, discrete, and non-arbitrary to his locus. However he may compartmentalize whatever change he may wish to study, his method must, in some arbitrary respect, cloak some remainder of reality. No formula may be adduced by mortals that will completely account for causation without respecting some minimum aspect about that which must remain ambiguous.

What a mortal may do, from his arbitrary or chosen perspective or framework of significance, is to record or experience his perception that, from “A,” in significant but inexact (fuzzy) respect of his environment (which overlaps and synchronously changes as he changes, in ways for which he has no complete or consistent explanation), it follows that “B” ... and so on.

Eventfully, synchronously, it may adduce to a mortal that his experiences happen to be manifested to him through a medium of relative constants, which are common and necessary to the defining of all perspectives with whom he is able to relate and communicate. In respect of the constancy of such mediums, we come to know them as true to shared experiences of our universe.

If we did not, on some level, share such a-priori, fore-knowledge of truth (whether conscious, subconscious, sensory, or merely reactive), we could not share the same universe. Any form of being that comes within our frame of reference or universe must, on some level, form in respect of such truths. No physical form may manifest to us unless it is synchronous with such truths. Our forms limit the kinds of forms that can manifest to us.

Even such relative constants, however, may eventually phase and change, as our environment becomes inhospitable to all with whom we have capacity to communicate about our universe. In respect of such transition or phase change, different forms of mortal consciousness may then evolve, for whom new relative constants may be hospitable to synchronous, serendipitous expressions of perspectives. Thus, mortal truth would pass from the relative constants of our universe to the relative constants of what would have become their universe.

Empiricism can lead us to appreciate such physics as we should not deny on faith. But, intuitive faith, however non-verifiable empirically, need not be inconsistent with empiricism. Rather, faith may be reinforced insofar as it can be shown not to be inconsistent with mathematics, yet consistent with intuitive empathy.

On faith, one may believe either that conservation does or does not apply “before” the Big Bang. We may best serve empirical purposes by appreciating that information about what may have occurred before the Big Bang is not subject to our empirical efforts. Even so, respecting questions beyond empiricism may serve legitimate purposes apart from science.

Eventually, mortals may bring into better focus that which divides what we may reasonably believe based on physical empiricism (“scientific how-ness”) from that which we may reasonably believe based only on empathetic intuition (“philosophic why-ness”).